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An empirical energy model for secure Web browsing
over mobile devices
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Department of Computer Science and Mathematics, Lebanese American University, Beirut, LebanonABSTRACT
Quantifying and modeling energy consumption in mobile devices are essential for developing energy-aware protocols and energy
reduction techniques. In this work, we address the energy requirements for secure Web browsing sessions over handheld mobile
devices. The contributions of this work are twofold. On one hand, we present a detailed study based on experimental measurements
to quantify the energy consumed by the mobile device during secure Web browsing sessions. This includes the energy consumed
due to data transmission/reception, encryption/decryption, hashing in addition to browser processing. On the other hand, we derive
an empirical energy consumption model for secure Web browsing as a function of various protocol and device parameters. The
developed model can be utilized to identify the various components that affect energy consumption during secure Web browsing
sessions, to implement application-layer energy models in network simulation tools, and to develop adaptive energy-aware Web
browsing protocols. The effectiveness of the developedmodel is demonstrated via experimental testing on several secure websites.
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Studies demonstrate that the high energy consumption of
battery-operated mobile devices is one of the main chal-
lenges for emerging mobile computing applications. Mobile
devices are shown to consume signiﬁcant energy because of
wireless connectivity activities via their network interfaces
(WiFi, cellular, bluetooth, etc.), various data processing
tasks, in addition to screen operation. This triggered a wide
range of research activities to model energy consumption
in mobile devices on the basis of the user behavior [1–3],
to analyze energy consumption in mobile devices on the
basis of wireless networking protocol design and operation
[4–8], and to develop different types of mechanisms to re-
duce energy consumption [9–13]. It is important to highlight
that most existing publications related to energy modeling in
mobile devices are based on experimental measurements
because of the difﬁculty of developing analytical models that
can accurately capture the operation of the mobile device in
relation to the energy drained from the battery.
In this work, we derive two empirical energy models for
secure Web browsing over handheld mobile devices on the
basis of extensive energy measurements using an experi-
mental test bed. The developed model captures the energyCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.requirements of the Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTPS) protocol taking into account HTTP and Transport
Layer Security (TLS) exchanged messages. The TLS pro-
tocol, which is an enhanced variant of the SSL 3.0 (Secure
Sockets Layer 3.0) protocol, is a standard protocol for
secure Web transactions over the Internet [14]. We quantify
and model the energy requirements in a mobile device due
to data transmission/reception, data encryption/decryption/
hashing based on different cryptographic algorithms, and
browser processing. The importance of the developed
model is multifold: It can be used for assessing the additional
energy requirements for securingWeb transactions, simulating
energy consumption for Web browsing applications in
network simulation tools, and designing new energy-efﬁcient
protocols for secure Web browsing, for example, protocols
that can support multiple levels of security from Web servers
in real time depending on the actual battery capacity of the
mobile device.
Energy consumption studies for Web browsing applica-
tions are presented in [15–17]. The authors in [15] proposed
a technique for saving energy during Web browsing by
switching the network interface to sleep mode when no data
is being received. The authors in [16] presented a technique
to enhance the performance of the power save mode of1037
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[17] developed an energy-efﬁcient architecture for Web
browsing with cooperation among mobile devices.
Several publications have also considered the perfor-
mance of security protocols over handheld mobile devices
using different measures. The authors in [18] analyze the
time taken to perform cryptographic functions for real-time
mobile transactions with focus on the SSL, S/MIME and
IPsec security protocols. The authors in [19] present a
comprehensive analysis of the SSL protocol and its crypto-
graphic algorithms with focus on connection establishment
time and data transfer time as performance measures. The
authors in [20] analyze the time latency and energy con-
sumption costs of different block ciphers by taking into
account encryption and decryption in addition to different
ﬁle size combinations. The authors in [21] present a com-
prehensive study on the energy consumption requirements
of various cryptographic algorithms by taking into account
the trade-offs between energy consumption and the level of
security. Moreover, they present an energy analysis for the
SSL protocol taking into account various transaction sizes.
The authors in [22] focus on designing an energy-efﬁcient
mechanism for restarting a secure communication after
disruption due to, for example, data loss. The authors in
[23] present a comparative performance study of the SSL
protocol between mobile devices and laptops with focus
on computational complexity and running time as the main
performance measures. They present results for each step
of the SSL handshaking protocols in order to highlight
the existing trade-offs with higher granularity.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, an
overview of the HTTPs protocol is presented to highlight
key protocol design aspects. In Section 3, a generic energy
model for secure Web browsing over mobile devices is
derived as a function of various design parameters and
HTTPs protocol messages. In Section 4, the implementa-
tion of an experimental energy measurement setup is
explained and a wide range of energy consumption mea-
surement results are presented and analyzed for data trans-
mission, reception, encryption, decryption, hashing, andFigure 1. Transport Layer Security handshaking protocols. The mess
server [14]. The * sign indicat
1038 Securbrowser processing. Moreover, the derived energy model
is tested using several secure websites in order to demon-
strate its effectiveness. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section 5.2. HTTPS PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
The HTTPs protocol is composed of a combination of the
HTTP protocol at the application layer and the TLS proto-
col (or SSL protocol), which runs on top of the transport
layer. During secure Web browsing sessions, the operation
of HTTPs is divided into two main phases. In the ﬁrst
phase, the TLS handshaking protocols are executed, which
include the TLS Handshake protocol, the TLS Change
Cipher Spec protocol, and the TLS Alert protocol. In the
second phase, the TLS Record Protocol is executed in
order to securely exchange encrypted HTTP messages be-
tween the mobile device and the Web server.
The main steps of the TLS Handshake Protocol are pre-
sented in Figure 1. These steps are mainly used for agreement
on a protocol version, exchange of important parameters and
keys, generation of shared secrets, selection of a suite of cryp-
tographic algorithms (authentication, encryption, and medium
access control (MAC) algorithms), and certiﬁcate authentica-
tion. Figure 1 includes as well TLS Change Cipher Spec pro-
tocol messages, which are used for notiﬁcation between the
mobile device and the server that subsequent messages will
be protected on the basis of the negotiated cipher suite. More
details on the TLS protocol can be found in [14].
The following are the main steps that take place as part
of the TLS handshaking protocols:
• The ﬁrst step is the connection initiation phase, which
involves exchanging hello messages. The hello messages
include session identiﬁer, protocol version number, ran-
domly generated numbers, and other information needed
to agree on the cipher suite. For example, the cipher suite
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 indicates that
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm is used forages exchanged between the mobile device client and the Web
es an optional message.
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DOkey exchange and authentication, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) is used in Cipher Block Chaining mode
for encrypting application-layer messages with a key size
of 128bits, and SHA-1 is used as a hash function for mes-
sage integrity veriﬁcation. The client initiates the secure
connection setup by sending the ClientHello message.
• In the second step, the server processes the ClientHello
message and responds with the ServerHello message.
The server sends its certiﬁcate using a ServerKeyExchange
message followed by a ServerHelloDone message. These
three messages are normally sent together as one TLS
record. The protocol also supports optional client authenti-
cation; in this case, the client should send its certiﬁcate on
the basis of a request from the server.
• In the third step, the client uses the information re-
ceived to authenticate the server. Then, it generates a
48-byte pre-master secret, encrypts it with the server’s
public key obtained from the server’s certiﬁcate, and
sends it to the server by using a ClientKeyExchange
message. The client then sends a ChangeCipherSpec
message to inform the server that subsequent mes-
sages will be encrypted using the symmetric key; the
ChangeCipherSpec message consists of a single byte
of value 1. The client ends by sending an encrypted
Finished message to indicate that the client part of the
handshake phase is ﬁnished. The client Finished mes-
sage is important to verify that the key exchange and
authentication processes were successfully set. The
ClientKeyExchange, ChangeCipherSpec, and Finished
messages are normally sent together as one TLS record.
• In the fourth step, the server uses its private key to
decrypt the pre-master secret. The pre-master secret
is used by both the client and the server in order to
generate the symmetric keys to be used for securing
message exchange in the TLS Record Protocol. The
server sends a ChangeCipherSpec message to inform
the client that subsequent messages will be encrypted
using the symmetric key. It then sends a ﬁnal
encrypted server Finished message to indicate that
the server part of the handshake phase is ﬁnished.
The ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages are
normally sent together as one TLS record.
• After the handshake phase is ﬁnished, the secure
exchange of HTTP application messages can be initi-
ated using the TLS Record Protocol. At the sender
side, the TLS Record Protocol fragments the applica-
tion-layer data into TLS records of size up to
16 384 bytes each, applies a MAC using a hashing
function, encrypts the obtained fragment using a sym-
metric algorithm, adds a 5-byte record layer header
(1-byte record type, 2-byte protocol version, and
2-byte length of data in the record), and hands the
encrypted fragment to the transport layer for further
processing and transmission. It is worth noting that cli-
ent message boundaries are not preserved in the TLS
Record Protocol; that is, multiple client messages may
be combined into a single record, or a single message
may be fragmented into multiple records. At the receivercurity Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
I: 10.1002/secside, the TLS Record Protocol extracts the record layer
header, decrypts the received fragment, veriﬁes the
MAC, reassembles decrypted fragments if applicable,
and delivers messages to the HTTP application layer.3. SECURE WEB BROWSING:
ENERGY MODEL DERIVATION
In this section, we derive an energy model for secure Web
browsing over mobile devices. We identify the main com-
ponents that contribute to energy consumption in a mobile
device during secure web browsing sessions. These in-
clude the energy drained from the battery during the TLS
handshaking phase (TLS Handshake Protocol and TLS
Change Cipher Spec Protocol operation) and the secure
Web data exchange phase (TLS Record Protocol opera-
tion). We divide these main components into two classes:
energy drained from the battery as a result of communica-
tions activities (data transmission and reception) and en-
ergy drained from the battery as a result of processing
activities (data encryption, decryption, hashing, etc.).
The total energy consumption ETotal in a mobile device
during a secure Web browsing session can be expressed as
follows:
ETotal ¼ EHandshake þ EWeb (1)
where EHandshake is the energy consumed during the TLS
handshaking phase and EWeb is the energy consumed dur-
ing the HTTP application-layer data exchange phase.
3.1. Transport Layer Security Handshaking
Phase
The energy consumed during the handshaking phase can
be decomposed as follows:
EHandshake ¼ EH-Exchange þ EH-Proc (2)
EH-Exchange captures the energy consumed due to com-
munications activities (data transmission and reception)
during the handshaking phase. It can be modeled as
follows:
The following are the deﬁnitions of the parameters in
Equation (3):
• ET is the energy consumed per byte during data trans-
mission, ER is the energy consumed per byte during
data reception, and EI is the energy consumed per sec-
ond during idle mode (device active with wireless in-
terface on, but not performing any processing or
networking activities).
• BH1 is the size of the ClientHello message in bytes.
• BH2 is the total size of the ClientKeyExchange, client
ChangeCipherSpec, and client Finished messages be-
cause they are normally sent together.1039
EH-Exchange ¼ ETð︸BClientHello
BH1
þ BClientKeyExchange þ BChangeCipherSpec þ BFinished
BH2
Þ
þERð BServerHello þ BServerKeyExchange þ BServerHelloDone
BH3
þ
︸
BChangeCipherSpec þ BFinished
BH4
Þ
þEItHandshake þ ETNH-Exchange;TBTCP=IP þ ERNH-Exchange;RBTCP=IP
þETCP-H
(3)
Energy model for secure Web browsing over mobile devices S. Sharafeddine and A. El Arid• BH3 is the total size of the ServerHello, ServerKeyEx-
change (includes server certiﬁcate), and ServerHello-
Done messages because they are normally sent
together.
• BH4 is the total size of the server ChangeCipherSpec
and server Finished messages because they are nor-
mally sent together.
• tHandshake is the total time of the handshaking phase.
Multiplying tHandshake by EI gives the total idle energy
consumption during the handshaking phase.
• NH-Exchange,T is the total number of handshaking proto-
col packets transmitted from the mobile device during
the handshaking phase. This is normally equal to two
because BH1 and BH2 are smaller than the maximum
transfer unit (MTU) size and, thus, ﬁt in one link layer
frame each.
• NH-Exchange,R is the total number of handshaking pro-
tocol packets received by the mobile device. It can
be modeled as follows: NH-Exchange,R = 1 + dBH3/
BMTUe because the size of BH4 ﬁts within one link
layer frame, whereas the size of BH3 is relatively large
(it contains the server certiﬁcate size) and, thus, might
require multiple packets. The MTU size is denoted as
BMTU with a typical value of 1500 bytes assuming an
Ethernet data link layer protocol.
• BTCP/IP is the total size of the headers added by the
transport (TCP), network (IP), and data link (Ethernet)
layers. Typical value of BTCP/IP is 58 bytes (20-byte
TCP header, 20-byte IP header, and 18-byte Ethernet
header).
• ETCP-H is the energy consumed due to TCP operation
during the handshaking phase. This includes transmis-
sion and reception of TCP segments as part of the
TCP connection setup phase. Normally, the setup
phase requires the exchange of three segments: trans-
mit SYN, receive SYN–ACK, and transmit ACK.
Moreover, ETCP-H includes the transmission of TCP
ACK segments to acknowledge the reception of hand-
shake messages from the server, especially as a result
of the reception of the server certiﬁcate, which is
normally divided over multiple packets depending
on its size.
EH-Proc captures the energy consumed as a result of the
processing activities in the mobile device during the TLS
handshaking phase. It can be modeled as follows:1040 SecurEH-Proc ¼ EKeyGen þ ECertVerify þ EFinished (4)
where EKeyGen is the energy consumed as a result of key
generation-processing activities including pre-master se-
cret encryption using RSA, ECertVerify is the energy con-
sumed as a result of processing activities to verify the
server certiﬁcate, and EFinished is the energy consumed as
a result of the client Finished message hashing and encryp-
tion before transmission in addition to the received server
Finished message decryption and MAC veriﬁcation.
It is important to note that it is common to repeat the
handshaking phase for each secure object in the website.
The repeated handshaking can be either in full mode or
in an abbreviated mode to resume a TLS session (also
called restart handshake). In case of a resumed session,
only hello, change cipher spec, and ﬁnished messages are
exchanged, which avoids the processing overhead of key
generation and RSA algorithm execution. The model pre-
sented in this section can be easily customized to cover
the different modes of handshaking (full or abbreviated)
and can be scaled by the number of times that the hand-
shaking phase is repeated during a given Web browsing
session.
3.2. Secure Web data exchange phase
After the handshaking phase ends, the mobile device starts
exchanging encrypted HTTP messages with the Web
server. These include sending encrypted HTTP request
messages (GET messages) and receiving Web objects.
During secure Web browsing sessions, not all Web objects
need to be encrypted in order to reduce the communica-
tions and processing overhead. For example, conﬁdential
information should be sent encrypted, whereas some
images or general website content can be sent plain with-
out any encryption. The energy consumed during the
Web data exchange phase can also be decomposed into
two components as follows:
EWeb ¼ EW-Exchange þ EW-Proc (5)
EW-Exchange captures the energy consumed as a result of
communications activities for exchanging HTTP protocol
messages. It can be modeled as follows:ity Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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XNns
i¼1
ðET BGET;i þ BTCP=IP
 
þER BData;i þ BData;i=BMTU
 BTCP=IP
 Þ
þ
XNs
j¼1
ðET BGET;j þ BTLS þ BTCP=IP
 
þERðBData;j þ BData;i=BMTU
 BTCP=IP
þ BData;i=BRecordMax
 BTLSÞþEItWebþETCP-W
(6)
The following are the deﬁnitions of the parameters in
Equation (6):
• Nns is the number of non-secure Web objects, and Ns
is the number of secure Web objects.
• BGET,i is the size of the HTTP GET message for the
ith object and BData,i is the size of the ith Web object.
Typically, the size of the GET message is smaller than
the MTU size, and thus, only one BTCP/IP term is
added to it to compensate for lower-layer headers’
overhead.
• BTLS =BMAC +BRecordHeader where BMAC is the size of
the MAC added by the TLS hashing algorithm (typi-
cal size: 20 bytes for SHA-1 algorithm), and BRecord-
Header is the size of the TLS record header (size:
5 bytes). It is important to note that this term is added
only for the secure objects because non-secure objects
are not processed via the TLS Record Protocol.
• BRecordMax is set to 16 384 bytes because the TLS Re-
cord Protocol fragments HTTP messages into records
of size up to 214 bytes.
• tWeb is the total time of the Web data exchange phase.
Multiplying tWeb by EI gives the total idle energy
consumption during the Web data exchange phase.
• ETCP-W is the energy consumed as a result of TCP
operation during the Web data exchange phase. This
includes the transmission of TCP ACK segments to
acknowledge the reception of HTTP response pack-
ets. Moreover, it includes transmission and reception
of TCP segments as part of the TCP connection termi-
nation phase. Normally, the termination phase
requires the exchange of three segments: transmit
FIN, receive FIN–ACK, and transmit ACK.
EW-Proc captures the energy consumed as a result of
processing activities for exchanging HTTP protocol mes-
sages. It can be modeled as follows:
EW-Proc ¼
XNs
j¼1
ðEHBGET;j þ EE BGET;j þ BMAC
 
þED BData;j þ BData;j=BRecordMax
 BMAC
 
þEHBData;jÞ þEBrowser
(7)
where EH is the energy consumed per byte as a result of
hashing processing operations, EE is the energy consumedSecurity Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
DOI: 10.1002/secper byte as a result of data encryption operations, ED is the
energy consumed per byte as a result of data decryption
operations, and EBrowser is the energy consumed by the
Web browser to render and display the website. It is impor-
tant to note that hashing is applied to the GET messages
before encryption; for this reason, the MAC size is added
to the GET message size before multiplying by EE. For re-
ceived data, the decryption is applied for a data size that
corresponds to the Web object’s total size in addition to
multiple MACs depending on the number of records the
Web object was fragmented into.
The energy model derived in this section applies to se-
cure and non-secure Web browsing sessions. For typical
HTTP Web browsing without TLS, the derived model
can be used by setting EHandshake = 0 and setting Ns = 0 in
Equations (6) and (7). The derived model is generic as it
applies to Web browsing sessions with mixed secure/non-
secure objects and to various hashing and encryption algo-
rithms. It is particularly suitable when the energy
consumed as a result of transmission/reception and as a re-
sult of cryptographic algorithms execution has a linear re-
lation with respect to the payload data size.
3.3. Secure Web browsing: simpliﬁed
energy model
In this section, we present a simpliﬁed model for estimat-
ing energy consumption for secure Web browsing ses-
sions. This model is based on the number of HTTP
messages encrypted/decrypted and the number of packets
transmitted/received. This model is particularly applicable
when the energy consumed during encryption/decryption/
hashing of a message does not vary notably for typical
message sizes (maximum size of TLS record is around
15 kB), and the energy consumed during transmission/re-
ception of a packet does not vary notably for typical packet
sizes (maximum size of Ethernet packets is around
1500 bytes). In this case, the energy would increase line-
arly with the number of messages encrypted/decrypted
and the number of packets transmitted/received. These
conditions are shown to be valid in real scenarios on the
basis of the experimental measurement results presented
in Section 4.
The total energy consumed as a result of communica-
tions activities for exchanging TLS handshaking messages
and secure Web data packets can be simpliﬁed as follows:
EExchange-S¼ET-Packet NH-Exchange;TþNW-Exchange;TþNTCP;T
 
þER-Packet NH-Exchange;RþNW-Exchange;RþNTCP;R
 
(8)
where ET-Packet is the energy consumed during transmis-
sion of a TCP/IP packet, ER-Packet is the energy consumed
during reception of a TCP/IP packet, NH-Exchange,T is the to-
tal number of TLS protocol packets transmitted during the
handshaking phase (typical value: two), NH-Exchange,R is
the total number of TLS protocol packets received during1041.
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of packets for the server certiﬁcate, which can be calcu-
lated as the size of the certiﬁcate divided by 1500 bytes),
NW-Exchange,T is the total number of transmitted packets
carrying HTTP GET messages (typical value: number of
objects), NW-Exchange,R is the total number of received
Web data packets (typical value: sum of the division of
the objects’ sizes by 1500 bytes), NTCP,T is the total num-
ber of transmitted control TCP segments during the TLS
handshaking and Web exchange phases (typically includes
ACKs, SYN, and FIN segments), NH-TCP,R is the total
number of received control TCP segments during the
TLS handshaking and Web exchange phases (typically
includes ACKs, SYN, and FIN segments).
The total energy consumed as a result of processing ac-
tivities during the TLS handshaking and Web data ex-
change phases can be simpliﬁed as follows:
EProc-S ¼ EE-Record þ EH-Recordð ÞNRecord;T
þ EH-Record þ ED-Recordð ÞNRecord;R þ EH-Proc
þEBrowser
(9)
where EE-Record is the energy consumed during encryption
of a TLS record message (maximum size of a TLS record
is 16 384 bytes), EH-Record is the energy consumed during
hashing of a TLS record message, ED-Record is the energy
consumed during decryption of a TLS record message,
NRecord,T is the total number of transmitted TLS record
messages (typical value: number of secure objects whereFigure 2. Experimental setup for measuring
1042 Secureach record message encapsulates an HTTP GET mes-
sage), NRecord,R is the total number of received TLS record
messages (typical value: sum of the division of the secure
objects’ sizes by 16 384 bytes), EH-Proc is the processing
energy during the handshaking phase as modeled in Equa-
tion (4), and EBrowser is the energy consumed by the
browser to render and display the website objects.4. ENERGY CONSUMPTION
MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Energy measurement setup
An experimental measurement setup is built in order to
capture the energy consumption from the battery of a
mobile device using real-time energy proﬁling. The setup
is composed of four main parts as shown in Figure 2: a
mobile device (HP iPAQh6340 [24]), a WiFi access
point (IEEE 802.11a), a data acquisition (DAQ) device
(NI USB-6008 [25]), and a processing module on a laptop
programmed using LabVIEW.
The data acquisition device measures the voltage across
a resistor with known resistance wired in series between
the mobile device and the battery. The measured voltage
is exported to a LabVIEW application, which performs
power calculations and plots power consumption proﬁles
in real time. All exchanged packets during the Web brows-
ing session are captured via a packet sniffer (Wireshark
[26]). The traces captured are important for analyzing the
website content for testing and veriﬁcation purposes.energy consumption in a mobile device.
ity Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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energy consumed by the mobile device during the execu-
tion of various cryptographic algorithms. The algorithms
are implemented in the .Net Framework under the name-
space System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs, which contains
the different needed classes. Moreover, the setup is used to
derive empirical expressions to model the energy con-
sumed by the mobile device during data transmission and
data reception via its wireless interface.4.2. Energy consumption due to
communications activities
In this section, we derive empirical expressions for the fol-
lowing two parameters: the energy ET consumed by the
mobile device per byte during data transmission and the
energy ER consumed by the mobile device per byte during
data reception. We perform energy measurements for vari-
ous data sizes ranging from 50 to 1500 bytes (maximum
packet size assuming Ethernet data link layer); for each
data size, we conduct 50 measurement runs in order to ob-
tain average results. Figure 3 presents typical power con-
sumption results during the different communicationsFigure 3. Typical energy measurement results during the fo
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Figure 4. (a) Energy consumption per byte ET in mJ during data tran
reception. Dots correspond to measurement points. So
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DOI: 10.1002/secstates of a mobile device: idle mode, transmit mode, and
receive mode. It can be seen that the device consumes
more energy when transmitting data compared with receiv-
ing data. Averaging the captured power consumption level
over a given window of time gives the amount of energy
consumed from the battery during that time.
In Figure 4, energy consumption results for ET and ER
are presented as a function of the transmitted and received
payload data sizes in bytes, respectively. It is worth noting
that the total energy consumption during data transmission
and reception is shown to increase at a slow rate as the pay-
load data size increases between 50 and 1500 bytes.
The following empirical expressions are derived using
curve ﬁtting on the basis of the obtained measurement
results:
ET ¼ 1:665e0:022BT þ 0:262e0:002BT (10)
ER ¼ 0:438e0:017BR þ 0:078e0:0016BR (11)
where BT and BR are the transmitted and received data
sizes in bytes, respectively. The accuracy of the curve ﬁt-
ting exceeds 95% in both cases. As the data size increases,
the energy consumed per byte is shown to decrease;llowing modes of operation: idle, transmit, and receive.
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Similar trends have been also reported in other publica-
tions; for example, see [7]. Moreover, the energy con-
sumed per byte during data transmission is notably more
than that during data reception. For example, a payload
data of 400 bytes consumes around 0.11mJ per byte to
be transmitted and around 0.04mJ per byte to be received.
During data transmission, the mobile device consumes en-
ergy for both data processing and transmission power so
that the signal arrives at the access point with high enough
signal-to-noise ratio. However, during data reception, the
mobile device consumes energy only for data processing.4.3. Energy consumption due to processing
activities
In this section, we present experimental energy measure-
ments for various cryptographic algorithms related to the
execution of the TLS protocol in the mobile device. These
include the public key encryption algorithm RSA, symmet-
ric key encryption algorithm AES, in addition to the hash-
ing algorithms MD5 and SHA-1. Measurements are
performed for various payload data sizes ranging from
250 to 50 000 bytes; for each data size, we conduct several
measurement runs in order to obtain average results.
Figure 5 presents sample encryption and decryption en-
ergy proﬁle results using the AES algorithm with a key
size of 128 bits and data size of 1000 bytes. The peaky
intervals in the ﬁgure correspond to energy consumption
above the idle level as a result of encrypt or decrypt0
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Figure 5. (a) Energy proﬁle for encrypting a 1000-byte message usin
size of 128 bits (time duration: 0.52 s, total energy consumption: 497
the AES algorithm with a key size of 128 bits (time
Table I. Energy consumption for various cryptographic
Algorithm 250bytes (mJ) 500 bytes (mJ)
AES (128-bit key) 36.71 38.03
AES (256-bit key) 38.04 44.09
RSA (1024-bit key) 56.05 56.55
SHA-1 32.21 33.46
MD5 30.11 33.13
AES, Advanced Encryption Standard; RSA, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman algorithm;
1044 Securprocessing activities; the overall energy consumed depends
on the algorithm’s complexity and computation time. AES
encryption as shown in the ﬁgure needs more computation
time as compared with decryption and, thus, consumes
higher energy: 497mJ and 465mJ are needed to encrypt
and decrypt a given 1000-byte message, respectively. The
recorded idle energy during these measurements is around
300mJ.
Table I presents measurement results for various crypto-
graphic algorithms as a function of the input payload size
in bytes. It is shown that the energy consumed per input
data block increases slowly as the payload size increases.
Moreover, AES with a 256-bit key size consumes slightly
more energy that AES with a 128-bit key size. In addition,
RSA has notably higher energy consumption compared
with AES because of the increased computational com-
plexity of public key encryption algorithms compared with
symmetric key algorithms. Finally, it can be noted that
both hashing algorithms MD5 and SHA-1 have similar en-
ergy consumption for the different payload sizes.
Finally, we performed a wide range of measurements to
model the processing energy consumed by the Web
browser (Internet Explorer) in order to render and display
websites of different sizes. The following empirical expres-
sion was derived for EmBrowser in mJ as function of the
website size S in kilobytes on the basis of the obtained
measurement results with ﬁtting accuracy over 95%:
EBrowser ¼ 0:56Sþ 4:14 (12)0
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(b)
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g the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm with a key
mJ). (b) Energy proﬁle for decrypting a 1000-byte message using
duration: 0.4 s, energy consumption: 465mJ).
algorithms in mJ as a function of input data size.
1000 bytes (mJ) 5000 bytes (mJ) 10 000 bytes (mJ)
45.21 49.33 55.06
46.49 53.19 55.07
62.11 64.85 67.11
34.52 36.22 39.68
34.31 37.59 39.85
SHA, Secure Hash Algorithm; MD, Message Digest.
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Energy model for secure Web browsing over mobile devicesS. Sharafeddine and A. El AridTable II presents measurement results for the energy
consumed as a result of the processing activities during
the TLS handshaking phase. These results provide typical
values for the different terms in Equation (4).4.4. Energy consumption during secure Web
browsing sessions
In this section, we analyze the energy consumption proﬁles
during secure Web browsing sessions for different web-
sites. Moreover, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
derived simpliﬁed energy model in Section 3 by comparing
the estimated energy consumption results with measure-
ment based results. Figure 6 presents energy proﬁle results
for downloading four secure websites having different
sizes and number of objects.Table II. Processing energy consumption during the Transport
Layer Security handshaking phase
Parameter Typical energy consumption (mJ)
EKeyGen 490
ECertVerify 111
EFinished 108
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Figure 6. Example energy proﬁles for downloading four different s
objects, website size 4000 bytes, download duration 13.1 s, total ene
objects, website size 5184 bytes, download duration 8.75 s, total ene
website size 14 489 bytes, download duration 31.5 s, total energy c
objects, website size 227 421 bytes, download dura
Security Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
DOI: 10.1002/secThe results demonstrate interesting observations related
to the energy consumption behavior during secure Web
browsing sessions. It can be seen that the download dura-
tion plays a key role in terms of the overall energy con-
sumption. Therefore, having higher-speed broadband
Internet connection leads to signiﬁcant reduction in energy
consumption mainly because of reduced communications
interface activity for data transmission and reception. It is
shown that websites with more objects have more peaky
intervals with higher density per interval. One can roughly
deduce the number of objects in the website by observing
the real-time energy consumption proﬁle. For example,
Figure 6a, 6b, and 6c corresponds to secure websites with
2, 4, and 11 objects, respectively. It is important to high-
light that the energy consumption for the Cellular Operator
Log In website presented in Figure 6d is signiﬁcantly
higher than the other cases because of the notably larger
download duration and the higher number of objects,
which leads to more HTTP GET requests, TCP control
messages, received HTTP Web data packets, and TLS
records to be encrypted, decrypted, and hashed.
We have also analyzed the content of a wide range of
secure websites in order to capture common implementa-
tion characteristics in terms of the used cipher suites, the
number of times the handshaking phase is executed, typi-
cal sizes of HTTP GET messages, typical sizes of server0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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ecure websites (a) Microsoft Online secure website (2 secure
rgy consumption 5150mJ), (b) University Email Portal (4 secure
rgy consumption 6788mJ), (c) IEEE Sign In (11 secure objects,
onsumption 23 307mJ), (d) Cellular Operator Log In (62 secure
tion 55 s, total energy consumption 63 034mJ).
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Energy model for secure Web browsing over mobile devices S. Sharafeddine and A. El Aridcertiﬁcates, and so on. The obtained results are summa-
rized in Table III, which includes the sizes of various mes-
sages that are exchanged between the mobile device and
the Web server during secure Web browsing sessions.
These statistics were collected from 13 secure websites
containing a total of 131 secure objects. The list of the
tested websites include institution e-mail portals, IEEE se-
cure pages (log in, shop me), Gmail, encrypted Google,
Microsoft Download, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo, and others.
The direction ﬁeld indicates whether the message is sent
from the mobile client to the Web server (C!S) or from
the Web server to the mobile client (S!C).
Table IV presents the obtained typical sizes in bytes for
TCP connection management control messages in addition
to typical sizes for the HTTP GET message.
Finally, we analyze the accuracy of the derived simpli-
ﬁed empirical energy model based on four secure Web
browsing sessions, having different characteristics, using
the following procedure:
(1) Download a secure website on the mobile device.
(2) Capture the energy consumption proﬁle using the
measurement setup. Calculate the total amount of
energy consumed and the total download duration
during the Web browsing session on the basis of
the measured proﬁle.
(3) Capture all the exchanged packets and extract the
needed parameters to apply the model; these include
the number of Web objects and their sizes, the num-
ber of times the handshaking phase is executed, the
TLS cipher suite, the total website size, and the total
number of transmitted/received packets including
TCP connection management and ACK segments.Table III. Typical sizes in bytes of various messages that a
Message Direction Med
ClientHello C!S
ClientKeyExchange C!S
Client ChangeCipherSpec C!S
Client Finished C!S
ServerHello S!C
ServerKeyExchange (with certiﬁcate) S!C
ServerHelloDone S!C
Server ChangeCipherSpec S!C
Server Finished S!C
Table IV. Sizes of different messages that are transm
Message type Size (bytes)
TCP SYN 66
TCP FIN 54
HTTP GET message 500–2500
1046 Secur(4) Apply the derived model to obtain an estimate of
the total energy consumed using the extracted web-
site parameters as inputs.
(5) Compare the obtained estimated energy consump-
tion level with the measured value and calculate
the percentage difference.
Table V presents a summary of the following main
parameters for each tested website: the total website size
in bytes, the number of secure objects (the selected web-
sites have all their objects secured), the number of times
that the TLS handshaking phase is executed, the total
download duration, the average GET message size, the to-
tal number of transmitted packets (including TLS hand-
shaking phase transmitted messages, GET requests, in
addition to TCP connection management and ACK seg-
ments), and the total number of received packets (including
TLS handshaking phase received messages, Web data
packets, in addition to TCP connection management and
ACK segments).
Results show that it is common to execute the hand-
shaking phase in abbreviated mode for each secure object
in the website. Moreover, cipher suites based on AES
(128 bit or 256 bit) and RC4 encryption with either MD5
or SHA-1 hashing are widely used.The size of the GET
message varies between different websites depending on
the length of the object’s path name and the number of in-
cluded header lines. The overall numbers of transmitted
and received packets are comparable because of the TCP
ACKs and are higher for websites containing more objects;
however, the total size in bytes of the received packets is
normally much more than the transmitted packets. It is im-
portant to note that the download duration is not linearlyre exchanged during secure Web browsing sessions.
ian (bytes) Minimum (bytes) Maximum (bytes)
157 124 165
134 134 262
1 1 1
36 32 48
74 42 85
2872 1425 5188
4 4 4
1 1 1
36 32 48
itted and received during Web browsing sessions.
Message type Size (bytes)
TCP SYN–ACK 66
TCP FIN–ACK 54
MTU size 1500
ity Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Table V. Website characteristics
Website Total size (bytes) Objects Handshake Duration (s) GET size (bytes) Tx packets Rx packets
Microsoft Download 4000 2 2 13.10 2368 14 13
Email Portal 5184 4 4 8.75 760 34 47
IEEE Sign In 14 489 11 11 31.50 1920 104 137
Cellular Operator 227 421 62 62 55.00 629 548 588
Table VI. Energy consumption comparison: estimated results versus measurement results.
Website
Proﬁle energy
(mJ)
Model Energy
(mJ)
Comm. Energy
(mJ)
Proc. Energy
(mJ)
Idle Energy
(mJ)
Difference
(%)
Microsoft Download 5150 5610 768 1021 3821 8.95
Email Portal 6788 7031 2112 1335 3584 3.55
IEEE Sign In 23 307 20 056 6352 2821 10 883 13.95
Cellular Operator 63 034 56 462 31 328 8397 16 737 10.43
Energy model for secure Web browsing over mobile devicesS. Sharafeddine and A. El Aridproportional to the website’s total size because it depends
as well on the network connection conditions and the route
between the client and the server for a given Web browsing
session.
Table VI presents a comparison between the measured
total energy consumption and the estimated total
energy consumption using the proposed simpliﬁed energy
model.
The following parameters are presented for each tested
website: the total energy consumption based on the mea-
sured energy proﬁle, the estimated total energy consump-
tion based on the proposed model, the portion of the
estimated total energy consumption due to communica-
tions activities (data transmissin/reception), the portion of
the estimated total energy consumption due to processing
activities (TLS cryptographic algorithms and browser op-
eration), and the portion of the estimated total energy con-
sumption that corresponds to idle operation of the device
(without any Web browsing or other processing activities).
Summing the values for the communications energy com-
ponent (Comm. Energy), processing energy component
(Proc. Energy), and idle energy component (Idle Energy)
gives the total estimated energy (Model Energy).
The results demonstrate a high level of accuracy for the
proposed model especially that testing was performed on
secure Web browsing sessions during real network condi-
tions. The difference between the estimated values and
the measured values ranged between 3.55% and 13.95%.
The derived model can be used to break down the total en-
ergy consumption into different components. Results show
that both communications activities and cryptographic pro-
cessing activities contribute notably to the total energy
consumption during secure Web browsing sessions. For
example, the energy consumed, as a result of the TLS
handshaking messages and cryptographic algorithms exe-
cution, exceeds the energy consumed as a result of the ex-
change of the HTTP messages for the Email Portal
website. This demonstrates the notable overhead of Web
security especially for websites that are relatively small in
terms of total size and number of objects.Security Comm. Networks 2012; 5:1037–1048 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
DOI: 10.1002/sec5. CONCLUSIONSWe addressed the problem of energy efﬁciency in hand-
held mobile devices for secure Web browsing applications.
We developed a generic empirical energy model that cap-
tures the different energy consumption components during
secure Web browsing sessions including communications
activities (transmission and reception), cryptographic algo-
rithms (encryption, decryption, and hashing), and device
idle mode operation. The derived model captures the key
design aspects of the HTTPs protocol. Moreover, we pre-
sented a simpliﬁed energy model that requires a lower
number of parameters and that is particularly applicable
to scenarios where the energy consumed does not vary
much as the payload data size varies within practical
ranges. In order to gain an in-depth insight on the energy
requirements of HTTPs and in order to validate the accu-
racy of the derived model, we presented and analyzed a
wide range of energy measurement results that capture
both communications activities and cryptographic algo-
rithms execution. Finally, we studied the energy proﬁles
of different selected websites, and we demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed model by comparing estimated
energy results to experimentally measured results.
The derived model can be used to identify the main fac-
tors that affect the energy consumption and to quantify
their contributions, as a function of various protocol and
device parameters during secure Web browsing sessions.
This insight can then be utilized to develop energy-aware
protocols for secure Web browsing applications. For exam-
ple, the proposed model can be easily used to assess the
impact of the following energy reduction approaches: re-
ducing the number of TCP ACKS, reducing the number
of times the TLS handshaking phase is executed, reducing
the number of secure objects in the website, using alterna-
tive cipher suites, using alternative implementations of speciﬁc
cryptographic algorithms, using cooperative communications
architectures to increase the transmission rate and reduce the
download time, and so on.1047.
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